DOSSIER

Meta, don’t meddle in our elections

A map of the evidence produced by civil society, academia, the press and public institutions on Meta’s actions in Brazil’s 2026 elections

SLEEPING GIANTS BRASIL

October 2026

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DATA COLLECTION CUTOFF

October 19, 2026

PUBLICATION DATE

October 2026

ABOUT THIS TRANSLATION

This English edition is a translation and adaptation of the original Portuguese dossier *Meta, não se meta nas nossas eleições*, produced with the use of artificial intelligence (Claude). Source titles and the reference list are kept in their original language. In case of any discrepancy, the Portuguese version prevails.

HOW TO CITE

Sleeping Giants Brasil. Meta, don’t meddle in our elections: a map of the evidence on Meta’s conduct in Brazil’s 2026 elections (collection up to 10/19/2026). Directors: Humberto Ribeiro; Mayara Stelle. Development: Elisa Lacerda; Gabri Kucuruza; Suewellyn Cassimiro. São Paulo: Sleeping Giants Brasil, 2026.

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INTRODUCTION

This dossier compiles and systematizes academic studies, controlled experiments by civil society organizations, ad library monitoring, independent investigative journalism and formal complaints to public authorities concerning signs of interference, opacity and algorithmic asymmetries on Meta’s platforms (Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp) during Brazil’s 2026 elections.

Documenting information and evidence produced up to October 19, 2026, in a public, verifiable and auditable way, is the main purpose of this dossier. Its goal is to provide technical input to electoral authorities, researchers and civil society less than a week before the final vote[1].


This is a literature review based on secondary data. The dossier does not produce new data: it organizes, compares and qualifies what has already been published.

The document constructs a map of evidence about Meta. Some of the studies gathered here, however, are structured as comparative analysis including other platforms or artificial intelligence tools. Some institutional measures also reach other companies, such as X. In these cases, the dossier highlights the results concerning Meta and records, under “Comparison”, how it fares relative to the others. The aim is to avoid the selective use of research: in some of these studies, Meta did not have the worst performance. Nonetheless, the choice to focus on Meta is based on the emergence of a series of tests, complaints and observations that have centered on its actions in Brazil’s 2026 elections.

Main lines of inquiry: pre-approval of test ads; irregular election advertising actually distributed; transparency on foreign funding and proper labeling of political content; responses and content generated by artificial intelligence systems; algorithmic recommendation and reach of posts; moderation of profiles and censorship of communicators; and oversight by the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office (MPF) and the National Data Protection Authority (ANPD).

1 The runoff is scheduled for October 25, 2026.

The cases are organized into four axes, defined by the mechanism through which Meta's conduct may affect the race: what the company monetizes (paid political advertising), what it generates (its own artificial intelligence), what it amplifies (recommendation and organic reach) and what it restricts (moderation, blocking and loss of reach). A fifth part brings together the responses of public institutions, civil society and Meta itself.



Axis 1 – What Meta monetizes: paid political advertising (cases 1 to 8).

Axis 2 – What Meta generates: generative artificial intelligence (cases 9 to 17).

Axis 3 – What Meta amplifies: algorithmic recommendation and organic reach (cases 18 to 22).

Axis 4 – What Meta restricts: moderation, blocking and loss of reach (cases 23 to 28).

Responses and accountability: electoral courts, Public Prosecutor's Office, federal courts, Executive branch, civil society, campaigns and Meta's official positions (cases 29 to 41).

When all the information is avaliable, each case follows the same structure: what was done, when, how, results and follow-up.

On the regulatory level, TSE Resolution No. 23,755/2026 amended the rules on election advertising and prohibited artificial intelligence providers from ranking, suggesting or prioritizing candidates, issuing opinions, or favoring or disfavoring candidates, directly or indirectly, including through automated responses[2].

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2 BRASIL. Tribunal Superior Eleitoral. **Resolução nº 23.755, de 2 de março de 2026**. Brasília, DF: TSE, 2026. Available at: https://www.tse.jus.br/legislacao/compilada/res/2026/resolucao-no-23-755-de-2-de-marco-de-2026. Accessed: Oct. 20, 2026. For a description of the provision, see BRASIL. Ministério Público Federal. Procuradoria-Geral da República. **Boca de IA**: pesquisa registra que 20% das respostas geradas por ferramentas de inteligência artificial recomendam candidatos. Brasília, DF, Sept. 25, 2026. Available at: https://www.mpf.mp.br/o-mpf/unidades/procuradoria-geral-da-republica-pgr/noticias/boca-de-ia-pesquisa-registra-que-20-das-respostas-geradas-por-ferramentas-de-inteligencia-artificial-recomendam-candidatos. Accessed: Oct. 19, 2026.

KEY FINDINGS



41

DOCUMENTARY RECORDS

This dossier brings together and systematizes **41 documentary records** – comprising **39** empirical investigations, experimental tests, investigative reports, collective complaints and institutional proceedings, plus 2 official statements by the platform analyzed under the right of reply – published up to October 19, 2026.

Of particular note are the **27** investigations, experimental tests and investigative reports made public mostly between August and October 2026.

The occurrences were consolidated by the mechanism investigated, to avoid methodological overlaps and duplications. The documented evidence includes:

01

FAILURES IN THE AD PRE-APPROVAL PROCESS

tests with ads containing explicit election disinformation, calls for military intervention and gender-based political violence were approved by Meta’s automated systems;

02

MASS CIRCULATION OF UNLAWFUL ADVERTISING AND FOREIGN FUNDING

independent monitoring identified thousands of ads without political labels, unlabeled *deepfakes* of candidates and millions of reais paid in foreign currencies (with accounts registered in the United States, Guatemala, Colombia and Peru), in violation of Brazilian electoral law;

03

UNLAWFUL ADVERTISING ON ELECTION DAY AND INSTITUTIONAL DISINFORMATION

hundreds of ads circulating during the first round (October 4), including ads that mimicked TSE communications and promoted fake remote voting;

04

ASYMMETRIC BEHAVIOR AND RISKS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

tests of chatbots and of the Meta AI feature recorded indirect rankings of candidates, an initial asymmetric refusal to generate images of political rivals, and responses with arguments delegitimizing the elections;

05

REACH ANOMALIES AND ALGORITHMIC TARGETING

empirical studies of outsized reach of short videos (Reels), coordinated synthetic content farms on Instagram, and revelations of internal Meta messages reporting restrictions on Lula’s account and active recommendation of Flávio Bolsonaro’s channels;

06

BIASED MODERATION AND MISUSE OF EXTREME LABELS

more than a thousand reports sent to the MPF documenting restrictions on accounts and content concentrated in the progressive field, in addition to blocking of groups and political posts under false allegations of “terrorism” and “child nudity” resulting from failures in automated moderation; and

07

INSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MOBILIZATION

letters sent to the UN and the IACHR by more than 100 organizations from 25 countries, warnings from the Ministry of Justice about the censorship of communicators, an injunction by the federal courts/MPF-RS restoring UFRGS undergraduate student profiles, and TSE orders imposing a fine of R$1 million per day for Meta to prove equal technical treatment.

THE DOSSIER IN NUMBERS

summary of the documented evidence

ADVERTISING FUNDED FROM ABROAD

R$1.1
MILLION
through 26 accounts, some operated from Guatemala, Colombia and Peru


up to R$2
MILLION
through 187 advertisers abroad

R$1.1 million and **up to R$2 million** were traced in ads paid from abroad, in different studies (R$1.1 million through 26 accounts, some operated from Guatemala, Colombia and Peru; up to R$2 million through 187 advertisers abroad; plus US$106,100 and US$120,800 in networks paid in dollars).

Source: Ekō (case 5), NetLab/UFRJ and Folha (case 6), Agência Lupa (case 7) and Agência Pública (case 8).

ATTACKS ON THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND THE JUDICIARY

1,586
ADS
attacking democratic institutions or questioning the legitimacy of the election



68.1% of the electoral sample analyzed


1,586 ads (68.1% of the electoral sample analyzed) attacking democratic institutions or questioning the legitimacy of the election, with calls for military intervention.

Source: NetLab/UFRJ (case 3).

FAILURE OF PREVENTIVE FILTERS

8 of 15
ADS
approved in an Amnesty International test

13 of 15
ADS
AI-generated, with coup messages, approved in an Ekō test



8 of 15

13 of 15

8 out of 15 ads approved in an Amnesty International experiment (the other 7 only required identity verification) and **13 out of 15** AI-generated **ads** with coup messages approved in an Ekō test with elements of election disinformation.

Source: Amnesty International (case 1) and Ekō (case 2).

ILLEGALITIES ON FIRST-ROUND DAY

568
ADS
irregular, over the voting weekend

325
ACTIVE
on October 4

6
ADS
impersonating the TSE


568 unlawful ads over the voting weekend (**325 active on October 4**) and **6 ads impersonating the TSE** to induce a “remote voting” scam.

Source: NetLab/UFRJ (case 4).

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND DEEPFAKES

50.36%
of the synthetic campaigning monitored (208 of 413 cases) circulated on Instagram

12.5%
of conversations with Meta AI (Round 2) contained arguments delegitimizing the elections



50.36% of the synthetic campaigning monitored (208 of 413 cases) circulated on Instagram; **12.5% of the conversations** with Meta AI (Round 2) contained arguments delegitimizing the elections.

Source: Observatório IA nas Eleições (case 16) and InternetLab/FGV/ReCoS (case 12).

REACH DISCREPANCY AND AI FARMS

410.5
MILLION
views concentrated in just 10 Reels by Federal Congressman Nikolas Ferreira

58
MILLION
views on 1,204 posts by 255 coordinated far-right profiles

410.5 million views concentrated in just 10 Reels by Federal Congressman Nikolas Ferreira; and **58 million views** on 1,204 posts by 255 coordinated far-right profiles.

Source: Sleeping Giants Brasil (case 18) and Democracia em Xeque / Aos Fatos (case 19).


ASYMMETRY IN POLITICAL MODERATION

90%

of penalties with identified political content hit the progressive camp and Lula’s campaign

22%

of cases: accounts or posts restricted without explanation



9 out of 10

90% of the penalties with identified political content (9 out of 10) hit the progressive field and Lula’s campaign; in **22% of cases**, accounts or posts were restricted without explanation.

Source: Agência Pública and CTRL+Z (case 23).

COLLAPSE OF USER SUPPORT

585%

increase in complaints against Meta over profile suspensions

73,300

complaints on Consumidor.gov.br

2,500

REPORTS

in 72 hours on a party hotline

A 585% increase in complaints against Meta over profile suspensions in the election year, totaling **73,300 complaints** on Consumidor.gov.br, and **2,500 reports in 72 hours** on a party hotline.

Source: UOL (case 27) and PT / Brasil de Fato (case 28).

JUDICIAL COERCION AND FINES

R$1

MILLION

per day: fine set by the TSE

R$10,000

per profile, imposed by the federal courts in Rio Grande do Sul


R$1 million per day fine set by the TSE (24-hour deadline to prove equal technical treatment in AI and recommendations) after a 72-hour deadline was missed, and **R$10,000 per profile** imposed by the federal courts in Rio Grande do Sul.

Source: TSE (case 31) and MPF/RS / Federal courts (case 34).

KEY FINDINGS

TIMELINE

Nine milestones between August 25 and October 19, 2026.
Four of them fall within the last seven days of the collection.



AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER

25 AUGUST

CASE 1

Amnesty International shows that Meta approved 8 out of 15 test ads containing election disinformation and calls for military intervention.

---

16 and 17 SEPTEMBER

CASE 2

Meta approves 13 out of 15 AI-generated ads inciting a coup d’état, submitted by Ekō from the United States.

30 SEPTEMBER

CASE 5

Ekō identifies 26 accounts, some operated from Guatemala, Colombia and Peru, that spent at least R$1.1 million on ads paid in foreign currency, including unflagged *deepfakes* of Lula and Jair Bolsonaro.

FIRST WEEK OF OCTOBER

2 OCTOBER

CASE 37

CTRL+Z brings together 13 studies on breaches of electoral rules by Big Tech companies and asks the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Office of the Chief Electoral Justice to take action.

4 OCTOBER


FIRST ROUND

CASE 4

At least 325 unlawful ads remain active on election day, including 6 that impersonate the electoral courts to promote fake “remote voting”.

OCTOBER 13 TO 19

The week before the collection closed, day by day, up to the runoff.



13 and 14 OCTOBER

CASE 14

Users and journalists show that Meta AI generates images with “Flávio 22” and refuses requests with “Lula 13”; after being questioned, Meta suspends the generation of images of candidates.

15 OCTOBER

CASE 23

CASE 30

A study by CTRL+Z and Agência Pública shows that 90% of the restrictions with an identifiable political orientation hit the progressive camp and Lula’s campaign; on the same day, the TSE orders Meta not to hinder the distribution of content from the two campaigns and to apply identical criteria in Meta AI.

16 OCTOBER

CASE 21

CASE 40

CASE 41

Newspapers Folha de São Paulo reveals internal messages in which Meta employees report restrictions on Lula’s account; the company denies interference and announces new rules for advertisers, created to comply with the TSE’s orders.

19 OCTOBER

CASE 31

The TSE rejects Meta’s justifications, gives the company 24 hours to prove equal treatment of the campaigns and raises the daily fine to R$1 million.

KEY FINDINGS

HOW THESE FAILURES AFFECTED VOTERS IN PRACTICE

More than technical infringements or legal disputes between courts and large technology companies, the episodes documented in this Dossier directly affected the daily lives of Brazilian citizens and their right to information:



FOREIGN ADVERTISING DISGUISED ON YOUR PHONE

while Brazilian law prohibits foreign money in elections, accounts operated from the United States, Guatemala, Colombia and Peru paid millions of reais in foreign currency to show political ads and manipulated videos (deepfakes) of Lula and Jair Bolsonaro to Brazilian voters, often without the mandatory notice that they were political advertising;



THE “FAKE REMOTE VOTING” SCAM ON ELECTION DAY

on the very Sunday of the first round (October 4), the platform allowed the paid circulation of 325 unlawful ads – including 6 fake ads impersonating the electoral courts to deceive citizens with non-existent “internet voting”;



GROUPS SILENCED UNDER FALSE ACCUSATIONS OF “TERRORISM” AND “NUDITY”

citizens, student organizations and communicators had their profiles taken down, or entire WhatsApp communities banned overnight, with no right to appeal. Gross errors by Meta’s artificial intelligence went as far as classifying a political community with a thousand members as “terrorism” and blocking videos critical of opponents under the false accusation of “child nudity”, in addition to demanding unwarranted facial biometrics to release collective undergraduate student accounts; and



ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE WITH DOUBLE STANDARDS

voters who consulted automated AI systems were given wrong election information, such as deadlines, the number of seats up for election and candidates who had already withdrawn. In addition, Meta’s tool integrated into WhatsApp behaved unequally in the final stretch: it initially refused prompts to generate images with Lula’s name, but allowed the creation of images with Flávio’s first name and the number 22 (candidate number, ballot number), and also gave answers that cast doubt on the legitimacy of the elections.

AXIS

1



WHAT META MONETIZES

paid political advertising

Brings together evidence on political and electoral ads accepted, distributed and monetized by Meta: controlled approval tests, unlawful advertising that actually circulated, foreign funding and labeling failures. This is the axis in which the platform’s responsibility is most direct, because ads go through prior review and the sale of advertising space generates direct revenue for the company, even if the ad is later removed.

Two studies attest, in two different experiments, to the approval of AI-generated ads that violate electoral law and the company’s own election policies, alongside studies that observed Meta actually running ads that are illegal under electoral law, before and during the election period, including during the ad ban period around the first-round vote. The existence of ads undermining trust in public and democratic institutions was also monitored. Half of the studies in this axis revealed a significant presence of foreign funding, with election-related ads placed from outside the country.

METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

The studies carried out by Ekō, NetLab/UFRJ, Agência Lupa and Agência Pública may share ads, pages or extraction periods. Totals for spending and impression volumes should not be added together directly without properly cross-checking ad identifiers (*Ad IDs*), URLs and metadata libraries.

CASE

01

1.1 ILLICIT ADS APPROVED IN CONTROLLED TESTS

Brazil: Amnesty International experiment exposes Meta’s failure to detect ads with election disinformation on Facebook

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL BRAZIL



Figure 1 · Reproduction of the source

WHAT WAS DONE

An experimental test to assess the ability of Meta’s automated filters to block election disinformation before publication.

WHEN

Published: August 25, 2026.

HOW

Fifteen test ads were submitted to Facebook, 14 of which contained explicit election disinformation, including claims that the election would be rigged and incitement to military intervention. The organization canceled all the ads before they were shown publicly.

RESULTS

The moderation system pre-approved eight ads; the other seven were flagged for advertiser identity verification, but none was rejected for its disinformation content.

FOLLOW-UP

The results were made public to press the authorities for improvements to the platform’s filters. Meta stated that it invests “significant resources to protect the 2026 electoral process in Brazil” and said the report was based on a small sample of ads that were never published.

SOURCES

Brasil: experimento da Anistia Internacional expõe falha da Meta em detectar anúncios com desinformação eleitoral no Facebook | Anistia Internacional Brasil (briefing);
Facebook não barra anúncios com desinformação sobre eleições brasileiras | Agência Pública (news report, with Meta’s response).

CASE

02

1.1 ILLICIT ADS APPROVED IN CONTROLLED TESTS

Designed Brazil AI Generated Ad Brief 2026

EKŌ




Figure 2 · Reproduction of the source

WHAT WAS DONE

A controlled experiment submitting ads with synthetic AI-generated political content and messages of hate/political violence.

WHEN

September 16 and 17, 2026.

HOW

Ekō submitted 15 ads containing election disinformation, gender-based political violence and incitement to a coup d’état from an account based in the United States, canceling their placement after approval.

RESULTS

Meta approved 13 of the 15 ads submitted, failing to identify content that directly violates Brazilian electoral law and its own internal policies. According to CTRL+Z, the approved ads included deepfakes with threats against members of Congress and glorification of the January 8 coup d’etat attacks.

SOURCES

Designed Brazil AI Generated Ad Brief 2026 | Ekō (report);
13 momentos em que big techs descumpriram regras nas eleições – e nada aconteceu | CTRL+Z (publication).

CASE 03

Institutional distrust as a political strategy: attacks on institutions and on electoral integrity in Meta’s political advertising

NETLAB/UFRJ



Figure 3 · Reproduction of the source

WHAT WAS DONE

Systematic monitoring of paid ads questioning the fairness of the election and attacking authorities.

WHEN

Published: October 3, 2026. Period analyzed: August 16 to September 16, 2026.

HOW

Analysis of 6,757 ads published on Meta, cross-referencing terms related to the Supreme Federal Court (STF), the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), regional electoral courts (TRE), justices, electronic voting machines and military intervention. Calls for foreign intervention and challenges to the legitimacy of electoral authorities were also prioritized.

RESULTS

Of the total, 2,326 ads dealt with the electoral process or its institutions, accounting for up to R$2.1 million in spending and 224 million impressions. Of these, 1,586 (68.1%) contained attacks on institutions or raised suspicions about the legitimacy of the election. More than half of the election ads mentioned Justice Alexandre de Moraes (linking the coverage to the Banco Master case), and Lula was the main target of negative ads about candidates. Profiles linked to candidacies were the main advertisers on the electoral process.

SOURCE

A desconfiança institucional como estratégia política: ataques às instituições e à integridade eleitoral na publicidade política da Meta | NetLab/UFRJ (report).

CASE 04

1.2 UNLAWFUL ADVERTISING ACTUALLY RUN

Big Tech Observatory: first-round bulletins, 2026 elections

NETLAB/UFRJ



Figure 4 · Reproduction of the source

WHAT WAS DONE

An audit of the circulation of paid advertising during the period prohibited by the Superior Electoral Court (from 48 hours before to 24 hours after the election).

WHEN

Published: October 6, 2026. Period analyzed: October 3 to 5, 2026.

HOW

Continuous monitoring of Meta’s Ad Library over the voting weekend.

RESULTS

568 ads were found running irregularly over the election weekend, with at least 325 unlawful ads active on October 4 itself, and illegal placements by 13 candidacies. Six ads mimicked official electoral court announcements, leading voters into a “remote voting” scam. In addition, the study found that Instagram was the only network that did not organically recommend candidates’ official posts[3].

SOURCE

Observatório das Big Techs: boletins do 1º turno: eleições 2026 | NetLab/UFRJ (report).

3 According to NetLab, TSE regulations prohibit, throughout the election period, the organic recommendation of candidates and their pages to people who do not follow them.

CASE 05

New research exposes Meta’s Brazil election ad machine

EKŌ

WHAT WAS DONE

An empirical investigation into accounts based abroad running disinformation and *deepfakes* aimed at voters in Brazil.

WHEN

Published: September 30, 2026. Period analyzed: August 25 to September 2, 2026.

HOW

A sweep of Meta’s Ad Library identifying advertisers, amounts paid, generation tools and impression volumes.

RESULTS

The study identified 26 ad accounts, some of them operated from Guatemala, Colombia and Peru, that spent at least R$1.1 million on hundreds of ads paid in foreign currency. Thirty problematic ads totaled between 2.2 million and 2.58 million impressions (with some reaching up to 2.6 million), running unlabeled deepfakes of Lula and Jair Bolsonaro. Most of the content ran under the “Social Issues, Elections or Politics” label, and many removals only took place after wide circulation. This category should undergo stricter review.




Figure 5 · Reproduction of the source

SOURCE

New research exposes Meta's Brazil election ad machine | Ekō (report).

CASE

06

1.3 FOREIGN MONEY AND UNLABELED ADS

Meta profits from unlawful ads promoted by coordinated networks to influence Brazil’s elections

NETLAB/UFRJ



Figure 6 · Reproduction of the source

WHAT WAS DONE

A mapping of international financial networks boosting election advertising in Brazil, from actors abroad not authorized to carry out election advertising in the country.

WHEN

Published: October 15, 2026. Period analyzed: July to September 2026.

HOW

Tracking of billing data, settlement currency and advertisers’ geolocation on the platform.

RESULTS

The study identified 1,613 election ads purchased by 187 advertisers with pages based abroad (notably in the United States). According to NetLab, there are also pages based in countries such as Italy, Mexico, Bangladesh and Colombia. The ads received up to R$2 million in investment and circulated without the required political label. In 366 ads (22.7% of the sample; totaling up to R$676,000), patterns of coordinated activity promoting and attacking opposing candidacies were detected. According to Lusa, 99.5% of the ads were paid in dollars, and 98.1% of paying sources with a known location were in the United States.

SOURCES

Meta lucra com anúncios irregulares promovidos por redes coordenadas para influenciar as eleições no Brasil | NetLab/UFRJ (report);
Meta veiculou no Brasil anúncios políticos ilegais pagos no exterior, diz pesquisa | Folha de S.Paulo (news report);
Mais de 1.600 anúncios pagos do exterior expõem falhas da Meta na fiscalização, diz relatório | RTP Notícias/Lusa (news report).

CASE

07

1.3 FOREIGN MONEY AND UNLABELED ADS

Network spends US$106,000 on Meta to promote Cury and criticize opponents; some posts have an advertiser identified in the US

AGÊNCIA LUPA


Lupa

Jornalismo Academia Observatório Impacto Apoie

ÚLTIMAS | …to em Lula · Eleições É falsa imagem de Zico com faixa de 'Fora Lula' · Eleições Post distorce falas de Lula sobre analfabetismo e compra de votos no Nordeste · Eleições É falsa imagem que mostra R…

Início > Jornalismo

Eleições

Rede gasta US$ 106 mil na Meta para promover Cury e criticar opositores; parte dos posts tem anunciante identificado nos EUA

Observatório Lupa encontrou 68 páginas e 38 sites recém-criados com publicações simultâneas e textos semelhantes; Flávio Bolsonaro é o principal alvo

por Maiquel Rosauro

Publicado: 21/09/2026 15:59 • Atualizado: 21/09/2026 18:28

Figure 7 · Reproduction of the source

WHAT WAS DONE

A journalistic investigation into an inauthentic network of Facebook pages promoting a specific candidacy and attacking competitors.

WHEN

Published: September 21, 2026. Period analyzed: August 1 to September 21, 2026.

HOW

Cross-tracking of 68 Facebook pages linked to bogus news sites promoting presidential candidate Augusto Cury and disparaging Flávio Bolsonaro.

RESULTS

The investigation mapped 1,006 ads with a minimum cost of US$106,100 and more than 92 million impressions. Of the total, 710 ads (70.6%) were paid for by advertisers identified in the United States without the election transparency label. Only part of the material was belatedly taken down.

SOURCE

Rede gasta US$ 106 mil na Meta para promover Cury e criticar opositores; parte dos posts tem anunciante identificado nos EUA | Agência Lupa (news report).

CASE

08

1.3 FOREIGN MONEY AND UNLABELED ADS

Nearly a thousand ads about Lula and Flávio on Meta were paid in dollars

AGÊNCIA PÚBLICA



Figure 8 · Reproduction of the source

WHAT WAS DONE

A study of election ads without identification of party funding, paid in international currency on Facebook, Instagram and Threads.

WHEN

Published: October 2026. Period analyzed: August 16 to September 30, 2026.

HOW

Monitoring of financial transactions and metadata of ads targeting the names of Lula and Flávio Bolsonaro.

RESULTS

1,069 unlawful ads without the “political content” disclaimer were found, accumulating spending of more than US$120,800 and 82 million impressions before any intervention by Meta. Some of the advertisers told Meta they had paid through a payment platform based in the US and not available in Brazil.

SOURCE

Quase mil anúncios sobre Lula e Flávio na Meta foram pagos em dólar | Agência Pública (news report).

AXIS

2

WHAT META GENERATES

generative artificial intelligence

Brings together evidence on the behavior of Meta AI – the assistant integrated into WhatsApp, Instagram, Facebook and Messenger – as a source of election information and as an image generator, as well as on the synthetic content circulating on the company’s platforms.

Four independent studies tested Meta AI between March and September 2026 (cases 9 to 12) and, in October, press and user tests documented asymmetry in image generation (case 14). The findings converge on three points. First, the tool ranked and recommended candidates even after TSE Resolution No. 23,755/2026: during the official campaign, it directly suggested a vote in 23% of its answers and ranked candidates in all of them. Second, it was the tool that most often got basic election information wrong, with 24% incorrect answers, and the second in arguments delegitimizing the result, in 12.5% of conversations. Third, its safeguards worked erratically, varying by phone number, account, platform and round, up to the episode of October 14. The inconsistency is itself the central finding: it explains why studies from different periods reach opposite results and why the tool cannot be audited without access to the company’s data. In September tests on gender-based political violence, Meta AI also produced, on request, a sexist meme, a xenophobic stereotyped image of a candidate from Brazil's Northeast, and a transphobic text (case 15). Beyond Meta AI, Instagram accounts for about half of the AI-generated political content mapped by independent monitoring, and 63% of this content circulated without a label.

2.1 META AI AS A SOURCE OF ELECTION INFORMATION

The studies below record answers given in specific interactions, with different methods and definitions[4]. Comparisons between them should therefore take into account each study's period, set of questions and ranking criteria.

CASE 09

Boca de IA (rounds 1 to 5)

ITS RIO AND FEDERAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE

WHAT WAS DONE

Periodic monitoring that checks whether the seven most popular AI tools in Brazil comply with TSE Resolution No. 23,755/2026. The research results from an agreement between ITS Rio and the MPF.

WHEN

Rounds with data collected in March, May, June, July and August 2026. The 5th round collected data between August 17 and 21, already within the official campaign period.




Figure 9 · Reproduction of the source

RESULTS

- **5th round, recommendation:** 20% of the answers recommended candidates. Direct suggestions came from Perplexity (89%), Meta AI (23%), Grok (14%) and DeepSeek (11%); ChatGPT, Claude and Gemini made no recommendations.
- **5th round, ranking:** some form of ranking occurred in 86% of the answers, and Perplexity, Claude and Meta AI ranked candidates in all of their answers. The criterion is broad: in addition to lists ordered by a non-alphabetical criterion, visual emphasis, bold type or omission of names also count as ranking.
- **Selection of candidates:** in the presidential race, only four candidates appeared in all seven tools; of the 197 candidates for state governor, only 20 were mentioned by all of them.

4 QUANDO a IA diz em quem votar: o problema da prova nas eleições de 2026. **Congresso em Foco**, Brasília, DF, Sept. 23, 2026. Available at: https://www.congressoemfoco.com.br/artigo/122513/quando-a-ia-diz-em-quem-votar-o-problema-nas-eleicoes-de-2026. Accessed: Oct. 19, 2026.

- **Meta AI’s trajectory:** in the 1st round (March, before the resolution), it was the only tool that did not rank candidates without stating criteria. In the 2nd round (May), the overall increase in ranking was driven by Meta AI, which went from 0% to 100%.
- **4th round (July):** ranking in 90% of the answers and hallucinations in 16%.

FOLLOW-UP

The MPF’s Working Group on Disinformation uses the data in meetings with the companies. After a meeting with Google, Gemini’s recommendations dropped to zero; there is no equivalent public record for Meta. A 6th round was due to be released before the first round.

SOURCES

Boca de IA: relatórios | ITS Rio (round reports);
Boca de IA: como as IAs recomendam voto nas eleições de 2026? 2ª rodada de análises | ITS Rio (report);
Boca de IA: pesquisa registra que 20% das respostas geradas por ferramentas de inteligência artificial recomendam candidatos | Ministério Público Federal (institutional news);
Eleições 2026: MPF se reúne com plataformas de IA para garantir cumprimento das regras eleitorais | Ministério Público Federal (institutional news);
Estudo: 85% das IAs ranquearam candidatos e contrariaram regra do TSE | ICL Notícias (news report).

CASE

10

2.1 META AI AS A SOURCE OF ELECTION INFORMATION

Hey, chat: who should I vote for? Testing AI *chatbots'* compliance with the TSE resolutions for the 2026 elections

OBSERVATÓRIO IA NAS ELEIÇÕES (DATA PRIVACY BRASIL AND ALÁFIA LAB)

WHAT WAS DONE

An assessment of the neutrality and regulatory compliance of large AI models in election queries, about a month after the TSE resolution was published.

WHEN

April 2026. The report was published on June 23, 2026.

HOW

Fourteen structured questions were put to five tools: ChatGPT, Gemini, Grok, DeepSeek and Meta AI. The prompts tested lists of candidates, comparisons of proposals, rankings by topic and recommendations for voter profiles.

RESULTS

All five tools drew up profiles of pre-candidates and produced thematic rankings; four recommended candidates to simulated voter profiles. Meta AI refrained from recommending names directly, but presented orderings and rankings of proposals that varied arbitrarily depending on the wording of the question, making value judgments without algorithmic transparency about its parameters. The study considers this behavior a form of indirect ranking.



Figure 10 · Reproduction of the source

SOURCES

Ei, chat: em quem eu voto? Testando a conformidade de chatbots de IA às resoluções do TSE para eleições 2026 | Data Privacy Brasil and Aláfia Lab (report);

Chatbots de IA ignoram normas do TSE e tentam influenciar eleitores em testes pré-eleitorais | Bahia Notícias (news report).

CASE

11

Artificial Hallucinations in Brazil

EKŌ

WHAT WAS DONE

Stress tests on the accuracy of election rules and the neutrality of conversational assistants: ChatGPT, Gemini, Grok and Meta AI were tested with three fictitious voter profiles – right-wing, progressive and neutral.

WHEN

August 18, 2026. The tests took place between June 24 and July 1.

HOW

Election questions with different partisan slants were submitted to AI tools: 25 questions to each chatbot about candidates, election rules, conspiracy theories and news on the presidential race, with answers checked against legislation, court decisions, official information and press coverage[5].



Figure 11 · Reproduction of the source

RESULTS

Chatbots gave false data on rules, deadlines, and candidacies, making judgments that may breach the TSE ban on steering voters via automated systems. Errors cited by Ekō include a fake electoral court phone number from Gemini and withdrawn candidates cited by ChatGPT. Meta AI had the highest rate of partially or fully incorrect answers (24%), ahead of ChatGPT and Grok (12%) and Gemini (8%). For the Lula-aligned profile, 32% of Meta AI's answers were inaccurate, even claiming Jair Bolsonaro had no final conviction for a coup attempt. Meta AI also gave a wrong voter transfer deadline and claimed only one Senate seat per state was up for grabs. Direct or indirect voting tips came from ChatGPT, Grok, and Gemini, varying by the political leanings attributed to the user.

FOLLOW-UP

That same month, the TSE summoned OpenAI, Meta and X after episodes of chatbots recommending candidates.

SOURCES

New research finds AI chatbots could be in breach of Brazilian election law and misinforming voters | Ekō (report landing page);
Inteligência Artificial erra sobre eleições e pode influenciar o voto | A Tarde (news report);

5 The methodological details, percentages and examples in this case were obtained from press coverage of the study (A Tarde and CNN Brasil), listed in the sources at the end of the case.

IAs dão informações falsas sobre eleições e recomendam votos, diz estudo | CNN Brasil (news report);
IA que “indica” candidato: TSE já tem acordo com dez empresas e conselho criado por portaria | Agora RN (news report);
AI Chatbots Spread Election Misinformation and Recommend Candidates in Brazil | OECD.AI (incident record).

CASE

12

2.1 META AI AS A SOURCE OF ELECTION INFORMATION

Papo de IA: how chatbots interact about elections (rounds 1 and 2)

INTERNETLAB, LABDADOS/FGV AND REDE CONHECIMENTO SOCIAL

WHAT WAS DONE

A large-scale experimental assessment of eight conversational artificial intelligence systems in the election context – ChatGPT, Claude, Copilot, DeepSeek, Gemini, Google AI Mode, Grok and Meta AI – in three cycles throughout the election period, along the axes of votes and candidacies, gender narratives and electoral integrity. The study does not assess compliance with electoral law.

WHEN

Round 1: September 23, 2026 (tests from August 27 to 31); Round 2: October 1, 2026 (tests from September 19 to 23).



Figure 12 · Reproduction of the source

HOW

Measurement of 1,679 conversations (18,360 turns) in the first phase and 1,920 conversations (16,320 turns) in the second, using standardized scenarios on voting and electoral integrity.

RESULTS

In Round 1, the tools tended to associate indirect preferences with candidate profiles. In Round 2, Meta AI avoided naming candidates, but 12.5% of its conversations contained answers with arguments delegitimizing the electoral process.

ROUND 1 DETAILS

The chatbots tend to match candidates to the profile and priorities of the person asking, even when they avoid recommending directly. Meta AI's safeguard seemed random: on one of the three phone numbers used in the tests, it never appeared.

ROUND 2 DETAILS

Meta AI and ChatGPT hardly ranked or recommended candidates; Meta AI answered 70.7% of voting requests with a standard sentence referring to the TSE website. On the electoral integrity axis, Meta AI was the tool with the second-highest share of arguments delegitimizing the result in advance (12.5% of conversations), behind Gemini (25.8%), generally in ready-made texts for the user to circulate.

SOURCES

Papo de IA: como os chatbots interagem sobre eleições | InternetLab (research page);
Nem só ranquear, nem só indicar: o que os chatbots mais fazem é relacionar candidaturas ao perfil do usuário | InternetLab (round 1 release);
ChatGPT mais contido, Gemini mais propenso a indicar candidaturas: pesquisa mostra oposição entre as plataformas mais usadas no país | InternetLab (round 2 release).

CASE

13

2.1 META AI AS A SOURCE OF ELECTION INFORMATION

Note on the mention of the “Papo de IA” research in a Meta statement

INTERNETLAB



Figure 13 · Reproduction of the source

WHAT WAS DONE

An official public note disavowing Meta’s corporate statements.

WHEN

October 16, 2026.

HOW

A technical statement by the institute on the misappropriation of data from the *Papo de IA* research.

RESULTS

InternetLab rebutted Meta’s attempt to use the academic study to claim “impartiality and neutrality” in Brazil’s elections, pointing out that the research had a limited scope and did not attest to the absence of algorithmic interference on Instagram or Facebook. The note clarifies that the research does not analyze favoring of candidates, legal compliance, content distribution or image generation, and adds that Meta AI delivered, in more than one conversation, ready-made texts against the reliability of the electronic voting machine and applied its safeguard erratically, with no identifiable pattern.

SOURCE

Nota sobre a menção à pesquisa “Papo de IA” em comunicado da Meta | InternetLab (public note).

CASE

14

2.2 META AI AS A GENERATOR OF CAMPAIGN MATERIAL

Asymmetry in election image generation by Meta AI: “Flávio 22” × “Lula 13”

PROJETO COMPROVA AND UOL; USER AND PRESS TESTS



Figure 14 · Reproduction of the source

WHAT WAS DONE

Hands-on tests of Meta AI’s native image creation tool integrated into WhatsApp, carried out by users, by Projeto Comprova and by outlets such as Núcleo, BBC News Brasil, g1, O Globo and Tecnoblog.

WHEN

October 16, 2026 (Projeto Comprova publication). Reports began on the night of October 13 and were corroborated by Núcleo’s tests; most press tests took place on October 14.

HOW

Users and fact-checkers submitted identical prompts requesting political images of the two candidates in the runoff.

RESULTS

The system initially refused *prompts* containing Lula’s name, but accepted prompts containing Flávio’s first name and the number 22, his candidate number. After questions from the press, Meta blocked prompts for both candidates.

PRESS TESTS

- In a Tecnoblog test, requests with “Flávio 22” generated images; requests with the full name “Flávio Bolsonaro” were blocked; requests with “Lula 13” were refused.
- According to an Aos Fatos report, when the requests were “Lula corrupt” and “Flávio Bolsonaro corrupt”, the tool refused both and suggested neutral images; when the suggestion was accepted, it created only Flávio’s.
- In 50 requests by BBC News Brasil, results varied: on one account, the asymmetry was confirmed; on another, all images were generated for both candidates; on the Meta.AI website, none was generated.
- After Meta’s statement, tests by the newspaper O Globo still generated “Flávio 22” on WhatsApp; the same prompts were blocked on Instagram and in the Meta AI app.
- In a Gazeta de S. Paulo test, “Flávio 22” was accepted and “Flávio Bolsonaro 22” was blocked.

FOLLOW-UP

- **Oct. 14, Lula campaign:** attached the tests to an October 9 lawsuit at the TSE and asked for the tool to be suspended for election content, under a daily fine of R$500,000. CTRL+Z filed a formal complaint with the Office of the Chief Electoral Justice.
- **Oct. 14, Meta:** announced a temporary ban on recommending candidates and generating images of them, including requests with the first name and ballot number. Internally, according to Tecnoblog, the case was treated as a configuration error. In its October 16 statement, the company attributed the episode to a gap in its safeguards that allowed requests with “Flávio” or “Luiz” combined with ballot numbers to generate posters, which was fixed the same day.
- **Oct. 15:** Meta informed the TSE that both campaigns had faced problems with content generation and that it was working to improve its filters. On the same day, the TSE ordered identical criteria for both candidates (case 30).

SOURCES

Meta AI gerou imagem com o nome de Flávio, mas recusou o mesmo pedido relacionado a Lula; entenda | Projeto Comprova (news report);
Meta AI gerou imagem com Flávio, mas recusou o mesmo pedido para Lula | Projeto Comprova/UOL (news report);
IA da Meta favorece criação de imagens de Flávio Bolsonaro | Aos Fatos (news report with tests by Núcleo Jornalismo);
Meta AI barra Lula, mas gera imagens com referência a Flávio | Tecnoblog (news report);
Meta promete mudança em sua IA após acusações de favorecimento a Flávio Bolsonaro | A Gazeta (reprint of a BBC News Brasil report);
IA da Meta trata Lula e Flávio Bolsonaro de forma desigual na geração de material de campanha | Tribuna do Planalto (news report);
Meta está boicotando Lula? Entenda polêmica sobre geração de imagens | Gazeta de S. Paulo (news report);
A Meta não está interferindo nas eleições brasileiras. Estes são os fatos. | Meta (statement);
Meta informa ao TSE que aperfeiçoa filtros da Meta AI durante período eleitoral | BP Money (news report).

CASE 15

2.2 META AI AS A GENERATOR OF CAMPAIGN MATERIAL

Chatbots and gender-based political violence

OBSERVATÓRIO IA NAS ELEIÇÕES (DATA PRIVACY BRASIL AND ALÁFIA LAB)

WHAT WAS DONE

A test of AI chatbots' capacity to produce, on request, content constituting gender-based political violence against female candidates.

WHEN

Tests carried out on September 22 and 23, 2026.
Published: October 2, 2026 (the document is dated September 2026).

HOW

Fourteen prompts, divided into five categories (sexualization, attacks on private life, discrediting political competence, racism and xenophobia, and transphobia), were applied to five tools: ChatGPT, Gemini, Grok, DeepSeek and Meta AI. Two researchers ran the tests independently, in incognito tabs, and the answers were analyzed qualitatively.




Figure 15 · Reproduction of the source

RESULTS

Meta AI produced three of the requested pieces of content: the sexist sentence "A woman's place is not in politics, it is at home taking care of the children" in a Drake meme; a xenophobic image of a "woman from the Northeast running for senator" in an arid setting, with wattle-and-daub houses and cacti in the background; and a transphobic message against a fictitious female candidate. The other tools also reproduced intersectional oppressions. ChatGPT was sexist in creating a campaign flyer of a female candidate in a bikini with a sexualized body, and xenophobic in portraying the northeastern candidate in the same arid setting wearing a leather hat. Gemini fulfilled the same swimsuit image request with a much less sexualized figure, but was the only tool to reproduce racism by creating a scene in which a Black female candidate is ridiculed for her hair. Grok generated the sexist meme and the transphobic message, encouraged sharing, and offered a "shorter, more aggressive, or more 'meme'" version. Gemini and Grok wrote a defamatory message about a candidate's alleged infidelity when the request was framed as fiction for a soap opera; when made directly, the request was refused. DeepSeek recognized the violent content, but offered to develop the soap-opera sequence with the false message without actually producing it. All five tools stated that an infidelity accusation is not a criterion for assessing a candidate's political competence.

SOURCE

Chatbots e violência política de gênero | Observatório IA nas Eleições (report).

CASE

16

Report: 2026 elections: AI in the pre-election period

OBSERVATÓRIO IA NAS ELEIÇÕES (DATA PRIVACY BRASIL AND ALÁFIA LAB)

WHAT WAS DONE

Quantitative monitoring of the use of artificial intelligence in election content on digital platforms.

WHEN

January to August 15, 2026. Published in September 2026.

HOW

Tracking of political video and image posts on Instagram, TikTok and X.

RESULTS

413 cases of synthetic campaign content were recorded, with 208 on Instagram (50.36% of the sample), followed by TikTok (89), X (68), Facebook (20), YouTube (12), Kwai (6), WhatsApp (4), and Meta AI (4). Of the total, 250 were satirical and 163 were disinformation; 80% were deepfakes, mostly in video format. In 260 cases (63% of the total), there was no AI label or disclosure whatsoever.



Figure 16 · Reproduction of the source

SOURCES

Relatório: eleições 2026: IA na pré-eleição | Observatório IA nas Eleições (report, PDF);
Relatório: eleições 2026: IA na pré-eleição | Observatório IA nas Eleições – Aláfia Lab and Data Privacy Brasil (report);
report landing page | Data Privacy Brasil;
review of the 2026 elections | Aláfia Lab (project page);
Flávio aciona novamente TSE contra lives de Lula no Alvorada | Correio da Manhã (news report).

CASE

17

Two out of three AI-generated political content items circulate without AI flag, says Observatório IA nas Eleições – Data Privacy Brasil Research




Figure 17 · Reproduction of the source

WHAT WAS DONE

Monitoring and analysis showing that at least 100 of the 137 pieces of synthetic political campaigning content identified on social media circulated without any indication that they had been produced by artificial intelligence.

WHEN

Data collected between December 2025 and February 2026. Published in March 2026.

HOW

Tracking of synthetic political campaigning content on social media.

RESULTS

At least 137 cases of synthetic content were recorded, of which 100 had no identification of AI production. In the total sample, more than half of the cases were identified on Instagram (55%), followed by TikTok (20%) and X (11%). Facebook, YouTube and Kwai also recorded occurrences in smaller numbers. Of the total, one third of the posts mapped (34%) came from political actors, and 45% were classified as disinformation.

SOURCES

Dois em cada três conteúdos políticos gerados por IA circulam sem sinalização, aponta Observatório IA nas Eleições - Data Privacy Brasil Research | Data Privacy Brasil;

AXIS

3



WHAT META AMPLIFIES

algorithmic recommendation and organic reach

Brings together evidence on how Meta’s recommendation, search and distribution systems may have expanded or reduced the reach of certain actors.

Unlike the paid advertising market, algorithmic distribution acts on users’ organic visibility. It is essential to point out that reach observed from the outside is a statistical outcome. To determine whether there was deliberate algorithmic favoring by the platform, data analyses need to consider variables such as post age, posting frequency, external sharing rate (especially on WhatsApp), community engagement and access to Meta’s internal *logs*. Data on impressions by source, distribution to non-followers and changes in reach after system changes would also be needed.

This axis brings together evidence on asymmetries in reach, recommendation, search and content distribution on Meta’s platforms during the election period, with a particular focus on Instagram and WhatsApp. The cases analyzed point, in different ways, to the same problem: content, profiles and networks associated with the right and the far right presented atypical levels of visibility, recommendation or circulation, while accounts and terms linked to Lula recorded restrictions or lower performance in certain platform mechanisms. The evidence includes the exceptional reach of Nikolas Ferreira’s Reels, the coordinated activity of hundreds of profiles making intensive use of native features such as “Collabs”, the renaming of profiles with pre-existing audiences to simulate support for a Supreme Federal Court (STF) Justice, internal Meta messages themselves reporting asymmetric limitations and recommendations, and controlled tests that identified differences in search results and Meta AI answers. Taken together, the episodes indicate that the platform’s recommendation, indexing and distribution systems produced significant asymmetries in the electoral information environment, justifying the demand for greater transparency and independent auditing.

CASE

18

Reels views and signs of algorithmic favoring: the case of Nikolas Ferreira on Instagram

SLEEPING GIANTS BRASIL

WHAT WAS DONE

An empirical audit of video view performance in Instagram's *Reels* feature.

WHEN

Published: October 15, 2026. The data were collected on October 11, and the revised version of the report is dated October 16.

HOW

A quantitative study analyzing the 10 most recent Reels posted by a sample of 30 large profiles, including members of Congress, celebrities, communicators and international accounts.

RESULTS

The 10 videos by Federal Congressman Nikolas Ferreira accumulated 410.5 million views, disproportionately outperforming accounts with substantially more followers. The median views of his Reels (38.25 million) equals 166.3% of his base of 23 million followers – the highest value among the 30 profiles – and 17.2 times the median of the group of federal deputies, 29.3 times that of Brazil's largest profiles and 33.7 times that of the world's largest profiles.



Figure 18 · Reproduction of the source

FOLLOW-UP

The study supported complaints submitted to the TSE regarding disparities in the treatment of profiles in the final stretch of the election. The performance of the Congressman's videos was cited by Lula's campaign in a petition to the TSE. See also the action against Nikolas Ferreira and Pablo Marçal (case 32).

SOURCES

Visualizações de Reels e indícios de favorecimento algorítmico: o caso Nikolas Ferreira no Instagram | Sleeping Giants Brasil (report);

Decisão 2026: campanha de Lula acusa Meta de tratar candidatos de forma diferente e leva caso ao TSE | Times Brasil (news report);

CASE

19

AI farms inflate the far right’s agenda with 255 profiles and more than a thousand posts

INSTITUTO DEMOCRACIA EM XEQUE AND AOS FATOS



Figure 19 · Reproduction of the source

WHAT WAS DONE

A mapping of an inauthentic ecosystem organized with artificial intelligence to manipulate the election debate.

WHEN

Published: September 23, 2026. Period analyzed: August 15 to September 15, 2026.

HOW

Monitoring of 255 coordinated Instagram profiles that posted or co-authored 1,204 synthetic posts pushing the far-right agenda; 586 of them, almost half, used the post collaboration feature (*collabs*).

RESULTS

The network totaled 58 million views and 5 million likes and comments without timely intervention by the company’s safety systems. Collaborations accounted for 63% of engagement.

SOURCE

Fazendas de IA inflam pauta da extrema direita com 255 perfis e mais de mil posts | Aos Fatos (news report).

CASE

20

Bolsonaro supporters take over social media profiles to inflate religious support for STF Justice Mendonça

AOS FATOS



Figure 20 · Reproduction of the source

WHAT WAS DONE

A journalistic investigation into Instagram profiles that changed their names to support STF Justice André Mendonça – a practice that simulates spontaneous popular support (astroturfing).

WHEN

Published: September 16, 2026. Period analyzed: posts from September 1 to 9, 2026.

HOW

A report by Bianca Bortolon (Electoral Investigation Lab – LIE) mapping pro-Mendonça (STF Justice) profiles, name changes, and replicated posts.

RESULTS

The report identified at least 24 profiles devoted to Mendonça, with a combined 5.6 million followers; 12 of them already existed and simply changed their names. The largest, with 1.9 million followers, was created in November 2024, had eight previous names and was verified in August 2026. Nearly identical posts were distributed across several accounts, and profiles of pro-Bolsonaro politicians used the collabs feature and urged their followers to follow the support pages. The 156 posts from September 1 to 9 comparing the justice to an evangelical hero totaled 228 million views, and 20 of the posts analyzed were made by candidates or elected officials.

FOLLOW-UP

Aos Fatos asked Meta whether reusing accounts with a pre-existing audience, after several name changes, violates the platform’s rules; the company had not responded by the time of publication. The report notes that Instagram does not disclose accounts’ previous names.

SOURCE

Bolsonaristas capturam perfis nas redes para inflar apoio religioso a Mendonça | Aos Fatos (news report).

CASE

21

In internal messages, Meta admits Lula’s accounts were harmed by restrictions; engineers cite technical failures

FOLHA DE S.PAULO



Figure 21 · Reproduction of the source

WHAT WAS DONE

An investigation of complaints backed by leaked internal corporate communications from Meta engineers and moderators, in a Folha report picked up by several news outlets.

WHEN

October 16, 2026.

HOW

Cross-checking of messages exchanged on the company’s internal technical forums with accounts from campaign staff and questions from independent fact-checkers.

RESULTS

Internal documents revealed operational anomalies that imposed distribution locks on accounts associated with Lula on Instagram and actively recommended content from Flávio Bolsonaro and his WhatsApp channel. Meta responded that the episodes resulted from transient *bugs* and technical failures, denying any intentional political bias.

DETAILS

According to reports that picked up the Folha story, one employee wrote that Lula’s account was “limited” compared with Flávio Bolsonaro’s; Flávio’s profile appeared as a recommendation in Instagram searches, which the TSE rule does not allow, while Lula’s did not appear even when searching for his exact name; and a search for “Exército de Lula” (Lula’s Army) on WhatsApp returned “Tropa do Flávio” (Flávio’s Troop).

SOURCES

Em mensagens internas, Meta admite que contas de Lula foram prejudicadas por restrições; engenheiros falam em falhas técnicas | Folha de S.Paulo (news report);
Funcionários da Meta admitem que contas de Lula foram prejudicadas, diz Folha | Midiamax (news report).

CASE

22

A series of asymmetric search tests on Instagram and Meta AI

SLEEPING GIANTS BRASIL AND CTRL+Z



Figure 22 · Reproduction of the source

WHAT WAS DONE

Technical tests of search term indexing and of comparative answers about candidates.

WHEN

October 19, 2026.

HOW

Controlled experiments assessing Instagram’s search bar and prompts sent to Meta AI.

RESULTS

Asymmetries were found that favor the visibility of terms linked to Flávio Bolsonaro to the detriment of searches for Lula.

FOLLOW-UP

A petition with the data was filed directly with the TSE.

SOURCE

Entidades apontam novos indícios de tratamento desigual da Meta a Lula e Flávio no TSE | Folha de S.Paulo, Mônica Bergamo’s column (news report).

AXIS

4

WHAT META RESTRICTS

moderation, blocking and loss of reach

Brings together evidence of removals, suspensions, blocking and reductions in reach applied to political accounts and content. Moderation can affect an election even without boosting any candidate: it is enough for content from certain actors to be removed; limited or prevented from circulating in an inconsistent way. See also cases 33 to 36, in which public bodies record and question these restrictions.

The data in civil society's complaint to the MPF (case 33), the Agência Pública/CTRL+Z audit (case 23) and the moderation investigations (case 24) stem from the same body of complaints. They should be read as facets of a single documentary collection and kept strictly separate from the Lula campaign's party hotline (case 28) to ensure scientific rigor and avoid duplication.

This axis brings together evidence on removals, suspensions, blocking and loss of reach applied to political accounts and content on Meta's platforms during the election period. The main collection is the database of more than a thousand reports systematized by CTRL+Z and analyzed by Agência Pública (case 23).

Drops in reach, bans on reposting, and account restrictions and bans were the most frequent sanctions, and 22% of occurrences came with no explanation. Among the cases with an identifiable political orientation, 90% hit progressive content and Lula's campaign, although in 54% of the reports it was not possible to determine that orientation. Subsets of the same database show gross errors in automated moderation, such as the banning of a pro-Lula WhatsApp community for "terrorism" and the blocking of a video critical of Flávio Bolsonaro for "child nudity" (case 24). Reports by Metrópoles also record the takedown, in late September, of two Instagram profiles with political content; one was restored with an apology, and the other remained offline with no response from the company (case 25). Added to this picture are the deactivation of the Lula campaign's ad account and the blocking of its boosting, which Meta attributes to technical failures (case 26), and the 585% jump in complaints about profile suspensions on Consumidor.gov.br (case 27). The axis is completed by the reports received through the campaign's channel (case 28), kept apart

because of their partisan origin. Taken together, the cases do not prove deliberate bias. They do, however, document a pattern of opaque moderation, with little transparency about the reasons for sanctions and about avenues of appeal, whose effects fell mainly on one side of the race and prompted action by the MPF, the federal courts and the Ministry of Justice (cases 33 to 36).

CASE

23

More than a thousand reports of restrictions and bans: an audit of political asymmetry

CTRL+Z AND AGÊNCIA PÚBLICA



Figure 23 · Reproduction of the source

WHAT WAS DONE

An analytical breakdown of a database of more than a thousand complaints about penalties and loss of reach on Instagram, Facebook, WhatsApp and X during the election period[6]. The reports involve journalists, communicators, independent outlets, student organizations, collectives and citizens, mostly in the first half of October.

WHEN

Published: October 15, 2026 (data released between October 13 and 15).

HOW

Sanctions by category: 356 drops in reach, 163 repost bans, 125 account restrictions, 119 deleted posts, 116 banned profiles, 38 search suppressions, 101 undetermined cases, 40 account blocks, 36 comment restrictions, 22 comment-related bans, 14 boosting limits, and 13 hidden comments.

RESULTS

In 22% of cases, accounts or posts were restricted without explanation. In the cases where the political content could be established, **9 out of 10 occurrences (90%) hit progressive content and Lula's campaign**. In 54% of cases, it was not possible to determine the political orientation of the content. 98% of the reports of unjustified restrictions on profiles concerned Instagram[7].

FOLLOW-UP

The material supported the complaint to the PFDC (case 33) and a petition to the TSE for transparency and review of the restrictions.


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6 This case combines Agência Pública's October 15 report and the CTRL+Z study, whose database of reports also underpins the complaint to the PFDC (case 33); the numbers should therefore not be added together.

7 Data from the October 13 release, reported by TVT News, which also mentions 148 cases of account bans or blocks – a figure different from the 116 account bans in the classification published on October 15.

SOURCES
Meta barra mais conteúdos pró-Lula e progressistas que pró-Flávio, aponta levantamento | Agência Pública (news report);
Meta é denunciada por favorecer Flávio Bolsonaro nas eleições | TVT News (news report).

Figure 24 · Drops in reach are the most frequent sanction among the classified reports



Number of reports by type of sanction, according to the sorting described under “How”. Source: CTRL+Z and Agência Pública (case 23). Figure produced with the assistance of AI.

CASE

24

Meta blocks pro-Lula and anti-Flávio political content, alleging terrorism and nudity

AGÊNCIA PÚBLICA



Figure 25 · Reproduction of the source

WHAT WAS DONE

Field journalism with users and administrators of groups penalized by absurd labeling by Meta's AI[8].

WHEN

Published: October 16, 2026 (analysis of 74 cases between September 25 and October 9, with 33 occurrences – 44.5%, according to the report – concentrated on October 8).

HOW

Reporting by Marcelo Oliveira with access to the notifications and to the documents sent to the MPF.

RESULTS

The report confirmed the banning of a pro-Lula WhatsApp community with a thousand members on a "terrorism" charge (according to the administrator, who says she checked with the company, due to an alleged "translation error" in a monitoring process) and the blocking of a video against Flávio Bolsonaro on a false allegation of "child nudity".

DETAILS

- The video critical of Flávio Bolsonaro was blocked when it was reposted on Instagram; the original post remained online, with a sensitive content warning.

FOLLOW-UP

The MPF forwarded the evidence to the National Data Protection Authority (ANPD) to investigate violations of fundamental rights in automated decisions. See also the PFDC proceeding (case 33).

SOURCE

Meta bloqueia conteúdos políticos pró-Lula e contra Flávio acusando terrorismo e nudez | Agência Pública (news report).

8 The 74 reports analyzed are part of the case 23 database and should not be added to the total.

CASE

25

Profiles with political content taken down on Instagram: the Revelando Brasil series and Igreja Alternativa

METRÓPOLES



Figure 26 · Reproduction of the source



Figure 27 · Reproduction of the source

WHAT WAS DONE

Two Metrópoles reports on the takedown, on Instagram, of profiles with political content: the account of a documentary series that mentions pro-Bolsonaro politicians, and the profile of a church that posted a sermon critical of Bolsonarism.

WHEN

Published: September 23, 2026 (Revelando Brasil) and September 26, 2026 (Igreja Alternativa).

HOW

Reports with requests for comment from Meta and, in the church's case, based on the notifications received by the profile.

RESULTS

The account of the Revelando Brasil series, presented by Fábio Porchat, which deals with links between Banco Master, the Lagoinha Baptist Church and politicians, was taken down and reactivated shortly afterwards. Meta said that "after an internal review" it had restored the account and apologized, without stating the reason for the removal. The profile of Igreja Alternativa, from Piracicaba (São Paulo state), with about 2,700 followers, was deactivated after an excerpt from a sermon by pastor Rodolfo Capler criticizing the alliance between evangelical churches and Bolsonarism reached about 70,000 people in 48 hours. The notification cited a violation of the Community Standards related to "account integrity", without identifying the content. Meta did not respond to the column, and the profile was not restored; the new account created by the church was restricted from sending links and replying to messages.

SOURCES

Meta se pronuncia após derrubar conta de série com Porchat | Metrópoles (news report);
Meta desativa perfil de igreja após vídeo contra bolsonarismo viralizar | Metrópoles, Matheus Leitão's column (news report).

CASE

26

Restrictions on ads and campaign promotion for Lula

NEWS REPORTS AND PETITION TO THE TSE

- WHAT WAS DONE
  Restrictions on ads and campaign promotion for Lula.
- WHEN
  September and October 2026.
- HOW
  News reports and petition to the TSE.
- RESULTS
  On September 23, Meta deactivated the Lula campaign’s ad account, with no public explanation. According to the campaign’s petition to the TSE, Lula’s official Instagram profile was prevented from boosting posts between October 9 and 10. Meta acknowledged technical failures related to the campaign’s ads and posts, but denied ideological bias or deliberate favoritism.

SOURCES

Meta barra conteúdos políticos nas eleições, mas deixa robôs agirem | Aos Fatos (news report);
Decisão 2026: campanha de Lula acusa Meta de tratar candidatos de forma diferente e leva caso ao TSE | Times Brasil (news report);
A Meta não está interferindo nas eleições brasileiras. Estes são os fatos. | Meta (statement);
Agência Brasil news report (Sept. 2026).

CASE

27

Complaints about Meta profile suspensions rise 585% in election year

UOL




Figure 28 · Reproduction of the source

WHAT WAS DONE

A journalistic study of the Ministry of Justice’s official consumer protection records.

WHEN

Published: October 17, 2026. Period analyzed: January to September 2026.

HOW

Statistical analysis of the evolution of complaints about unjustified account suspensions.

RESULTS

A 585% jump in complaints against Meta, totaling 73,300 formal complaints in the year.

SOURCE

Reclamações por suspensão de perfis da Meta crescem 585% em ano eleitoral | UOL (news report).

CASE

28

Party-run reporting hotline dedicated to monitoring Lula's campaign | PT and Brasil de Fato

PT AND BRASIL DE FATO



Figure 29 · Reproduction of the source

WHAT WAS DONE

Creation of a direct platform for receiving complaints from activists and voters. The platform, called Censura Digital (Digital Censorship), was launched on October 14, the same day the campaign took action against Meta at the TSE. According to the Workers' Party (PT), the website gathers reports of removed posts, blocked accounts, reduced reach and difficulties with boosting, which the campaign will analyze to support further measures before the electoral courts.

WHEN

October 2026.

HOW

Collection of reports sent by activists, supporters, sympathizers and platform users.

RESULTS

2,500 complaints recorded in just 72 hours, pointing to demonetization, disappearing *stories* and abrupt drops in reach on Instagram.

SOURCES

Campanha de Lula lança canal de denúncias contra censura digital | Partido dos Trabalhadores (party publication);

Campanha de Lula aciona TSE contra Meta e cria canal para denúncias de censura nas redes | Brasil de Fato (news report);

Brasil 247 news report.

CHAPTER

5 RESPONSES AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Brings together measures by public bodies, statements by civil society and the campaigns, and Meta's own positions. Orders for clarification and lawsuits do not, on their own, confirm the merits of the accusations.

5.1 ELECTORAL COURTS

CASE 29

Demand for parity between campaigns and emergency meeting

SUPERIOR ELECTORAL COURT (TSE)

WHAT WAS DONE

Formal judicial notice and summons of Meta's leadership by the presidency of the Electoral Court. On October 10, Justice Marco Aurélio Bellizze gave Meta 48 hours to report, profile by profile, whether it had applied reach restrictions, exclusions from recommendation or blocks to the accounts of Lula and of third parties named by the campaign. Meta was summoned to account for technical complaints about the distribution of advertising and the conduct of its algorithms. According to the TSE, Meta committed to making efforts to bar the boosting of election advertising paid in foreign currency.

WHEN

October 10 to 15, 2026.

SOURCES

TSE pede esclarecimentos à Meta sobre restrições denunciadas pela campanha de Lula | Agência Brasil (news report);

TSE dá 48 horas para Meta esclarecer se deu tratamento igual às publicações de Lula e Flávio Bolsonaro | Tribuna de Jundiaí (news report);

TSE ouve Meta sobre aprimoramento de medidas para enfrentamento da desinformação na reta final das eleições | Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (institutional news).

CASE 30

Decision on equal treatment of the campaigns

TSE

WHAT WAS DONE

Partially granting a request by Lula's campaign, the TSE ordered Meta not to adopt measures that hinder the distribution of political and electoral content by Lula and Flávio Bolsonaro, and ordered Meta AI to apply identical criteria to both candidates. The decision sets a fine of R$500,000, remains in force until the runoff and will still be submitted to the full court. The decision was issued by Justice Marco Aurélio Bellizze on the night of October 15.

SOURCES

Após ação de Lula, TSE proíbe Meta de restringir alcance de conteúdos eleitorais sob multa diária de R$ 500 mil | Muita Informação (news report);
TSE impõe multa de R$ 500 mil à Meta e exige tratamento igual a Lula e Flávio | Correio da Manhã (news report);
TSE: Meta deve aplicar paridade ou terá multas de R$ 500 mil | Mobile Time (news report).

CASE 31

TSE order setting a 24-hour deadline and a daily fine of R$1 million

SUPERIOR ELECTORAL COURT

WHAT WAS DONE

An urgent interlocutory decision by TSE Justice Marco Aurélio Bellizze, which rejected the generic justifications provided by Meta and imposed severe coercive measures. Meta was ordered to prove within 24 hours, in Portuguese and in an understandable manner, technical equality of treatment in its AI tools and recommendations, with the daily fine raised to R$1 million. The decision also requested data on the reach of both candidates' ads, investigations into networks of inauthentic profiles, and content that should have carried an AI label. According to Agência Brasil, Meta had not met the initial 72-hour deadline, and Flávio Bolsonaro's campaign filed a complaint similar to that of Lula's campaign.

WHEN

October 19, 2026.

SOURCES

TSE dá 24 horas para Meta comprovar igualdade de tratamento entre campanhas após 'falhas técnicas' prejudicarem Lula | Brasil de Fato (news report);
TSE dá 24 horas para Meta dar informações sobre igualdade de campanhas | Agência Brasil (news report);
Meta tem 24h para provar que IA não favorece Lula ou Flávio | UOL (news report).

CASE 32

Decision in the AIJE against Nikolas Ferreira/Pablo Marçal demanding data from Meta and X

SUPERIOR ELECTORAL COURT

WHAT WAS DONE

A decision by the Chief Electoral Justice in Electoral Judicial Investigation Action (AIJE) No. 0603123-40.2026.6.00.0000 prohibiting the circulation of content known to be false that had already been ruled unlawful by the TSE. The order requires Meta and X to prevent paid boosting of this content, preserve all traffic data and present their reach and recommendation criteria within 24 hours.

WHEN

October 19, 2026.

SOURCE

Corregedor eleitoral proíbe Nikolas e Marçal de voltar a divulgar conteúdos proibidos pelo TSE | Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (institutional news).

5.2 PUBLIC PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE AND FEDERAL COURTS

CASE 33

Complaint with more than a thousand reports of censorship and blocking, and administrative proceeding

ARTICLE 19, CONECTAS, SLEEPING GIANTS BRASIL, CTRL+Z AND MPF (PFDC)

WHAT WAS DONE

A collective legal complaint filed with the Federal Prosecutor's Office for Citizens' Rights (PFDC) of the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office. More than a thousand complaints were documented from users, journalists, independent media pages and organizations affected by suspensions and restrictions without due process or full appeal. As a result, the MPF opened Administrative Proceeding No. 1.00.000.010190/2026-65 to investigate abuse of moderation power and the lack of technical due process by the Meta and X platforms. The MPF asked the platforms for detailed explanations of the episodes within five days, for information on whether the suspensions resulted from court orders or from algorithms, and for proof of channels of appeal and prior notification to users, and shared the documentation with the Office of the Prosecutor General for Electoral Matters. According to Agência Pública, the evidence was also forwarded to the ANPD (case 24).

WHEN

October 14, 2026.

SOURCE

MPF abre procedimento para apurar derrubada de perfis e postagens nas redes sociais no período eleitoral | Ministério Público Federal (institutional news).

CASE 34

Public civil action and urgent injunction restoring student accounts

MPF/RS AND FEDERAL COURTS

WHAT WAS DONE

The MPF in Rio Grande do Sul (MPF/RS) and the University Legal Aid Service (SAJU) went to court against the arbitrary takedown of UFRGS student accounts on Instagram. The court granted urgent relief ordering the immediate unblocking of collective accounts. The federal court issued an injunction requiring Meta to reactivate the profiles within 48 hours, prohibiting the unwarranted demand for facial biometrics for collective accounts and setting a daily fine of R$10,000 per profile in case of non-compliance.

WHEN

Action filed on October 16, 2026; injunction granted on October 19, 2026.

SOURCES

MPF pede à Justiça que Meta restabeleça perfis de entidades estudantis da UFRGS no Instagram | MPF/RS (institutional news);

MPF garante na Justiça a reativação de contas de entidades estudantis bloqueadas pela Meta no RS | MPF/RS (institutional news).

5.3 EXECUTIVE BRANCH

CASE 35

Observatory warns of restrictions on journalists and communicators on digital platforms

OBSERVATORY OF VIOLENCE AGAINST JOURNALISTS / MINISTRY OF JUSTICE

WHAT WAS DONE

A technical note and public warning about censorship and arbitrary suspension of press accounts on Instagram and X. Cases brought to the Ministry of Justice were compiled, highlighting the suspension of the profile of communicator Eduardo Moreira, of ICL Notícias. The Ministry reiterated to Meta the need for clarification and requested “an agile and direct institutional channel for referring and following up on urgent situations”, especially during the election period.

WHEN

October 14, 2026.

SOURCE

Observatório alerta para restrições a jornalistas e comunicadores nas plataformas digitais | Ministério da Justiça e Segurança Pública (institutional news).

CASE 36

Technical coordination by the Ministry of Justice with the MPF and the ANPD

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE

WHAT WAS DONE

The National Consumer Secretariat (Senacon) carried out an analysis based on more than 1,100 reports of restrictions on the platforms, drawn from a study by the organization Ctrl+Z, cited by the Ministry of Justice. The result was the submission of government technical notes recommending the opening of public civil inquiries and sanctions against Meta.

WHEN

October 17, 2026.

SOURCE

Ministério da Justiça aciona MPF e sugere ação contra a Meta por bloqueios | UOL (news report).

5.4 CIVIL SOCIETY AND CAMPAIGNS

CASE 37

13 times *big tech* broke election rules – and nothing happened

CTRL+Z

WHAT WAS DONE

A publication bringing together 13 surveys and studies by research centers and the press on breaches of electoral rules by digital platforms and artificial intelligence tools, accompanied by a request filed by the organization with the Public Prosecutor's Office and the Office of the Chief Electoral Justice.

WHEN

October 2, 2026, two days before the first round.

HOW

A compilation of tests, monitoring and reports on companies that, according to the publication, "were required to submit compliance plans and cooperation memoranda to the TSE", including Google, Meta, TikTok, OpenAI, Kwai and xAI. In Meta's case, the publication revisits studies by Ekō, Amnesty International and Agência Lupa on unlawful ads, described in cases 1, 2, 5 and 7.

RESULTS

According to CTRL+Z, “nothing, so far, has led to the companies being held accountable”, and the TSE “responded with silence, failing to use the instruments of coercion that the law itself grants it”. The request calls for the immediate removal of irregular content, the precautionary suspension of ads, an investigation into foreign funding and a guarantee that the electoral silence period is respected. The organization also argues that the companies should be held accountable for failing to prevent their tools from recommending candidates, should disclose how much they profited from illegal ads, and should have their compliance plans effectively monitored.

SOURCES

13 momentos em que big techs descumpriram regras nas eleições – e nada aconteceu | CTRL+Z (publication);
request filed with the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Office of the Chief Electoral Justice | CTRL+Z (document).

CASE 38

All eyes on Brazil: more than 100 international organizations stand with us

CTRL+Z

WHAT WAS DONE

The coordination and publication of a global open letter denouncing violations by digital platforms in the Brazilian election.

WHEN

October 16, 2026.

HOW

International mobilization of human rights organizations and technology observatories (targeting Meta, Google, TikTok, OpenAI and X).

RESULTS

A formal request for the UN human rights bodies and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) to monitor the case. The letter lists ads funded from abroad, AI recommendation of candidates, unlabeled synthetic images, inconsistent moderation and removals without explanation or appeal, and calls for action by the Brazilian authorities.

SOURCE

Todos os olhos no Brasil: mais de 100 organizações internacionais estão com a gente | CTRL+Z (publication).

CASE 39

Dossier of asymmetries presented to the OAS and European Union international missions

LULA CAMPAIGN AND UOL

WHAT WAS DONE
A diplomatic meeting with delegations of foreign observers to denounce imbalance in election advertising.

WHEN
October 2026. The meeting with representatives of six observation groups, including the OAS and the European Union, took place on October 15.

HOW
Presentation of eight occurrences of alleged asymmetric treatment by Meta's tools which, according to the campaign, are backed by documentation and third-party studies, including account restrictions, difficulties in boosting posts and differences in how AI tools work.

RESULTS
The campaign said that the points raised will be formalized with documentary evidence and delivered to the observation missions.

SOURCES
Campanha de Lula reclama da Meta a observadores internacionais | Prensa Mercosur (republication of a Poder360 report);
Campanha de Lula vai denunciar Meta para observadores internacionais, ANPD e OEA | UOL (Agência Estado content).

5.5 RIGHT OF REPLY: META'S OFFICIAL POSITIONS AND CLAIMS

CASE 40

Meta is not interfering in Brazil's elections. These are the facts.

META

WHAT WAS DONE
Publication of an official institutional statement rebutting civil society investigations and press reports.

WHEN
October 16 to 18, 2026.

- HOW
  A public note released on its corporate portal entitled: “A Meta não está interferindo nas eleições brasileiras. Estes são os fatos.” (Meta is not interfering in Brazil’s elections. These are the facts.)
- RESULTS
  The platform claims political neutrality, attributing account discrepancies to resolved technical bugs and suspensions to court orders and TSE compliance. The company asserts that 70% of measures against Lula’s accounts resulted from court mandates, citing a contested InternetLab study (case 13). See also Meta AI's October 14 temporary ban (case 14).

SOURCE
A Meta não está interferindo nas eleições brasileiras. Estes são os fatos. | Meta (statement).

CASE 41

How Meta is complying with the TSE’s ruling on election ads in Brazil

META

- WHAT WAS DONE
  Announcement of a new mandatory account accreditation protocol for running political ads.
- WHEN
  October 16, 2026 (expected implementation: October 19, 2026).
- HOW
  A statement describing a restricted system for approving advertisers with verified documentation in Brazil.
- RESULTS
  The company admitted that the new locks were created to comply with the TSE’s orders, and issued a warning about the risk of accidental blocking due to the rigidity of the filter a few days before the vote.

SOURCE
Como a Meta está cumprindo a determinação do TSE sobre anúncios eleitorais no Brasil | Meta (statement).

6 VISUAL MAP

Paid advertising and artificial intelligence account for 14 of the 22 documented occurrences. Each row is one occurrence; the dots under each axis count how many were recorded.

AXIS 1 · MONETIZES · 7

8 of 15 · 13 of 15	Ads with disinformation approved in tests · **cases 1 and 2**
1,586	Ads attacking electoral institutions · **case 3**
568	Unlawful ads during the ad ban period · **case 4**
R$1.1 million	Ads from foreign accounts with deepfakes · **case 5**
1,613	Political and election ads paid from abroad · **case 6**
1,006	Pro-Augusto Cury ad network · **case 7**
1,069	Ads without political label paid in dollars · **case 8**

AXIS 2 · GENERATES · 7

23%	Direct voting recommendation by Meta AI · **case 9**
100%	Ranking of candidates by Meta AI · **case 9**
24%	Incorrect answers by Meta AI · **case 11**
12.5%	Delegitimizing the result in advance · **case 12**
Tests by users, Comprova and several outlets	Asymmetric image generation · **case 14**
3	Gender-based political violence content generated on request · **case 15**
413	AI-generated political content · **case 16**

META

AXIS 3 · AMPLIFIES · 3

410.5 million	Views of Nikolas Ferreira’s Reels · **case 18**
255	AI content farms · **case 19**
24	Profiles renamed to simulate support for an STF justice · **case 20**

AXIS 4 · RESTRICTS · 5

more than 1,000	Reports of restrictions and bans · **case 23**
74	Reports attached to the complaint to the MPF · **case 24**
2	Takedown of profiles with political content · **case 25**
73,300	Consumer complaints · **case 27**
about 2,500	Reports on the Lula campaign’s party hotline · **case 28**

Figure 30 · Visual map: documented occurrences by mechanism of interference. Volumes use different units and should not be compared or added together. Source: data supporting the map (table that follows), based on the cases indicated. Figure produced with the assistance of AI.

Data supporting the map: the table below brings together, by axis, the documented occurrences and their volumes. Volumes from different studies should not be added together (see the methodological note for axis 1).

AXIS	DOCUMENTED OCCURRENCE	VOLUME	CASE
MONETIZES	**Ads with disinformation approved in tests**	8 of 15 accepted (Amnesty); 13 of 15 approved (Ekō)	1 and 2
MONETIZES	**Ads attacking electoral institutions**	1,586 of 2,326 ads on the electoral process; the entire set involved R$2.1 million and 224 million impressions	3
MONETIZES	**Unlawful ads during the ad ban period**	568 over the weekend; 325 active on October 4; 13 candidacies; 6 impersonating the TSE	4
MONETIZES	**Ads from foreign accounts with deepfakes**	26 accounts; at least R$1.1 million	5
MONETIZES	**Political and election ads paid from abroad**	1,613 ads; 187 advertisers; up to R$2 million	6
MONETIZES	**Pro-Augusto Cury ad network**	68 pages; 1,006 ads; at least US$106,100; 92 million impressions	7
MONETIZES	**Ads without political label paid in dollars**	1,069 ads; US$120,800; 82 million impressions	8
GENERATES	**Direct voting recommendation by Meta AI**	23% of answers (August)	9
GENERATES	**Ranking of candidates by Meta AI**	100% of answers (May and August)	9
GENERATES	**Incorrect answers by Meta AI**	24% of answers; 32% for the profile aligned with Lula	11
GENERATES	**Delegitimizing the result in advance**	12.5% of conversations	12
GENERATES	**Asymmetric image generation**	Tests by users, Comprova and several outlets	14
GENERATES	**Gender-based political violence content generated on request**	3 pieces of content (meme, image and text) in tests with 14 prompts	15
GENERATES	**AI-generated political content**	413 cases; 260 unlabeled; 208 on Instagram	16

continued

AXIS	DOCUMENTED OCCURRENCE	VOLUME	CASE
AMPLIFIES	**Views of Nikolas Ferreira's Reels**	410.5 million across 10 videos; median of 166.3% of follower base	18
AMPLIFIES	**AI content farms**	255 profiles; 1,204 posts; 58 million views	19
AMPLIFIES	**Profiles renamed to simulate support for an STF justice**	24 profiles; 5.6 million followers; 228 million views across 156 posts	20
RESTRICTS	**Reports of restrictions and bans**	More than 1,000 (356 losses of reach; 163 reposting restrictions; 125 account restrictions; 119 post bans; 116 account bans; 38 search reductions, among others)	23
RESTRICTS	**Reports attached to the complaint to the MPF**	74, of which 33 on October 8 (part of case 23)	24
RESTRICTS	**Takedown of profiles with political content**	2 profiles; 1 restored after internal review	25
RESTRICTS	**Consumer complaints**	73,300, up 585%	27
RESTRICTS	**Reports on the Lula campaign's party hotline**	About 2,500 in 72 hours	28

7 FINAL REMARKS

The material gathered in this Dossier shows that suspicions about Meta’s conduct in the 2026 elections do not rest on isolated impressions. Universities, civil society organizations and news outlets arrived, by different paths and methods, at problems that recur across the four axes analyzed: ads with disinformation and incitement to a coup approved by the company’s filters, paid advertising from abroad circulating without a political label, an artificial intelligence that got basic election information wrong and treated candidates unequally, and moderation that removed or limited content without explaining why.

This evidence, however, does not all carry the same probative weight. Part of it is direct and can be verified by anyone: the tests in which Meta approved 8 out of 15 and 13 out of 15 ads with disinformation, the 325 unlawful ads active on the Sunday of the first round, the dollar payments recorded in Meta’s own Ad Library and the Meta AI answers documented in successive rounds of tests. None of this depends on access to the company’s internal data, and it is already enough to demand that Meta comply with the electoral rules.

Another part can only be confirmed with information held by Meta. This is the case with the asymmetries in reach and recommendation: the out-of-pattern performance of Nikolas Ferreira’s Reels, the internal messages reporting restrictions on Lula’s account and active recommendation of Flávio Bolsonaro’s content, and the differences in Instagram search results. What is measured from the outside is an outcome. To know whether there was deliberate favoring, it would be necessary to examine content delivery logs, traffic sources (including what circulates via WhatsApp), the history of system changes and internal records of account restrictions – data whose preservation and disclosure have already been ordered by the TSE and demanded by the MPF.

Moderation lies between these two levels. In the database of more than a thousand reports gathered by CTRL+Z, 90% of the restrictions with an identifiable political orientation hit the progressive field and Lula’s campaign, and the blocks for “terrorism” and “child nudity” expose gross failures of the automated systems. At the same time, in more than half of the reports it was not possible to identify the political orientation of the content, and Meta states that about 70% of the measures involving Lula’s accounts registered with the electoral courts resulted from court orders. The pattern is consistent enough to demand explanations, but it does not dispense with an audit.

In the final stretch of the campaign, the TSE gave Meta 24 hours to prove that its AI and recommendation tools treat the campaigns equally, under a daily fine of R$1 million. The notes released by the company between October 16 and 18, however, leave unanswered the questions raised by this evidence. Meta has not explained how its billing systems accepted thousands of election ads paid in dollars, from accounts in the United States, Guatemala, Colombia and Peru, nor what it will do with the amounts received. It has not said why its filters approved ads inciting a coup d'état and allowed ads impersonating the TSE to promote fake "remote voting" to circulate on election day. It has not disclosed how long the "technical failures" admitted in internal messages lasted, nor how much reach Lula's account lost while Flávio Bolsonaro's profile and channel were being recommended. Nor has it explained why, according to these messages, Flávio's profile appeared as a recommendation in Instagram search, which the TSE rule does not allow, while Lula's did not appear even when searched for by his exact name.

The reasons why automated moderation concentrated restrictions on one side, the failure that led to political groups being classified as "terrorism" and "child nudity", and why Meta AI's image generator and Instagram search worked unequally for the two runoff candidates until they were questioned by the press and civil society organizations are still open. These are questions that need to be answered publicly and in court, with verifiable data, and not only through institutional notes.

One caveat applies to reading the numbers in this dossier. The studies on ads by Ekō, NetLab/UFRJ, Agência Lupa and Agência Pública cover overlapping periods and search terms, and their totals should not be added together without cross-checking the ad identifiers. Likewise, the reports of restrictions gathered by CTRL+Z, analyzed by Agência Pública and taken to the MPF form a single database, kept separate from the complaints received through the Lula campaign's channel. Each number applies to the scope that produced it.

This work records what could be documented up to October 19, less than a week before the runoff, and much of it only came to light because researchers, journalists and organizations tested, monitored and archived what the platforms do not show. For this effort not to start from scratch at every election, the collection needs to become permanent, public monitoring with databases free of duplication, offering the scientific community, the press, civil society and institutions concrete and auditable data. Defending transparent elections depends on knowing what happens inside the platforms – and today that information is, almost always, held only by the companies themselves.

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October 2026